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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The objective of this study, approved July 1993, is to 
investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. 
This report details the finding of the first two years of the research effort and outlines the 
path forward. 
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year 
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflects the highway needs of the 
state. The General Assembly approves those projects that will be funded in the coming 
biennium. Reasonable cost forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that 
funding is available and projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule. 
KRS45.245, effective I July, 1992, grants the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation 
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project--
design, right-of-way, utility relocation, or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in 
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. Estimates developed using current methods 
have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. To date 
(7/1/92 - 7/1/95), 263 overruns totaling nearly $117 million, have been submitted to the 
IJCT --all have been approved for additional funding. No concerted effort was made to track 
the number of cost underruns. 
Estimates for highway projects are usually the responsibility of the 12 District Highway 
Offices, which have few resources allotted to estimating. Furthermore, initial estimates, 
based on very little information, don't statistically support a ±15% confidence level. In light 
of the high variability of estimates based on little information and the lack of resources 
dedicated to estimating, a reasonable approach is to base estimates on actual costs of past 
projects. For the conceptual estimate, the one used for initial authorization of a project, a 
cost-per-mile figure based on similar past projects can be used. After the design is completed 
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on a new project, estimates for the remaining phases--right-of-way, utility relocation, and 
construction--can be updated to reflect design decisions such as route, grade and drain, etc. 
A Cost-per-mile Model is being developed to asset estimators make conceptual estimates 
based on a database of preconstruction and construction project costs for the past four years. 
A Cost-per-parcel Model and database is being developed to assist in estimating right-of-way 
costs, and updating the conceptual right-of-way estimate, once a route is established. 
Emphasis for Year 3 of this study will be to complete the Preconstruction, Construction and 
Right-of-way databases and the Cost-per-mile and Cost-per-parcel Models; to develop and 
implement a training plan for the use of the models; and to recommend new and/or modified 
procedures to improve the ability of the KyTC to forecast highway costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need has been recognized by the Kentucky 
Transportation Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHW A). A research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHW A, 
starting in July 1993, to study current practices and to recommend improvements for the 
estimating process. The project timetable specifies the following annual goals: 
• Year I (7 /93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary 
recommendations for potential improvement areas. 
• Year 2 (7 /94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to rmprove the 
estimating process. 
• Year 3 (7 /95-6/96) - Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use. 
The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work comes from a law enacted 
during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July I, 1992, mandates 
that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-way, utility 
relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium, highway plan 
(2YP) by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's Interim 
Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT must 
include written certification from the State Highway Engineer that the overrun was caused by 
unanticipated circumstances, and provide specific details on the reasons for the cost overrun. 
The IJCT determines if the proposed additional money is reasonable and necessary, and also, 
if any alteration made or planned since its consideration by the General Assembly materially 
changed the project. 
This, the second interim report, discusses the findings of the first two years of the project: 
• Summary of First Year's Findings- reviews the research findings presented in the first 
interim report, March 1994. 
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• Estimates During the Period of Study - presents an analysis of the cost overruns > 15% 
during the research period. 
• Preconstruction Cost-per-mile Database - reports on the collection of past project data for 
the three preconstruction phases: design, right-of-way, and utility relocation. 
• Construction Cost-per-mile Database - reports on the collection of past project data for 
the construction phase. 
• Cost-per-mile Model - presents a computer model that sorts data from the preconstruction 
and construction databases to assist an estimator make an estimate based on past 
performance. 
• Performance Measurements - outlines procedures to allow the KyTC to measure quality 
improvement in the estimating process. 
• Right-of-way, Cost-per-parcel Database - reports on the collection of past project data for 
the right-of-way phase and presents plans for a cost-per-parcel model to assist estimators 
in updating right-of-way estimate after project scope is determined. 
• Conclusions - reports conclusions based on research findings to date. 
• Preliminary Recommendations - makes recommendations based on the research effort to 
date. 
• Path Forward - work to be accomplished during the third year of the research. 
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SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S FINDINGS 
The section provides a summary of the status of the research effort when the first interim 
report was issued in March 1994. The statements used reflect conditions at that time and 
may be updated later in this report to reflect current conditions. 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to 
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reason seems to be not so much that the cost 
forecasting ability of the KyTC has declined of late, but that the Legislature has voted itself 
more oversight of the 2YP execution. The reporting requirements of the oversight law, 
KRS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway 
department. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is required, are in some cases impossible 
to meet, and in other cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not 
performing current duties. 
The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem; 
solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is 
not feasible. There are three ways to mitigate the problem of poor cost forecasting. The first 
is for the Legislature to either forego the oversight or to modifY it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels, the second is for the KyTC to change how the 6YP 
and the 2YP are developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve 
its estimating ability. All of these options have financial and political implications. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted in 134 overruns worth over $69 million being 
presented to the IJCT for review during the current biennium to date (7/1/92 - 2/13/94). All 
of these overruns were approved. The IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns, which would provide as much evidence of poor cost forecasting as overruns do. 
The oversight seems to be used not so much to improve KyTC's cost forecasting ability as it 
is to make a political statement about who is in charge of getting highways constructed in the 
Commonwealth. If this is indeed the case, and if blanket approval of all overruns is assured, 
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then perhaps a continuation of the status quo is acceptable. However, currently the KyTC is 
trying to appease the IJCT by increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to 
report phase overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP 
and 2YP impossible, and has the potential of causing the loss of federal funds if and when 
there aren't enough projects in the 6YP ready to be advanced into the 2YP to utilize approved 
federal aid. 
The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modifY it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the 
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem 
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate 
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by 
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT by 
report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only those 
overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be examined, not those that will be summarily 
approved. 
The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change 
would be to complete either an in-depth scoping study and/or preliminary design prior to 
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization 
of the 6YP be funded by state funds. 
The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require 
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's 
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right-
of-way and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estimating. Also, demands for on-
the-spot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed 
project prior to submitting the initial estimate. 
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The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other 
states. The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the 
legislative oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of 
the highway plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many 
states are better staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable 
amount of preliminary design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan. 
Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to 
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the current estimating and cost forecasting 
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are how to better use 
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating 
procedures. 
Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make 
them available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve 
estimating ability but will serve to help justifY estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting 
ability and to the relationship between the K yTC and the Legislature. To seize this 
opportunity both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political 
and fiscal realities. 
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ESTIMATES DURING THE PERIOD OF STUDY 
Estimates developed using current methods have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude 
cost overruns in excess of 15%. Since the law became effective, (7/1192 - 7/1195), 263 
overruns, totaling $116,792,686 have been submitted to the IJCT. All have been aPProved 
for additional funding. 
The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past coptes of the 
Notification to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning 
Project Phase Cost Overruns > 15%. This document, an overrun summary, is submitted 
by the KyTC to the IJCT for a phase overrun> 15% and is identified by a tracking number. 
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences, by phase. Figure 3 
shows a breakdown of overrun costs, by phase. 
Figure I - Overrun Occurrences by Phase Figure 2- Overrun Costs by Phase 
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Table 1 shows the cost and frequency breakdown, by phase, of the 263 overruns to date. 
Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase and the number of occurrences of 
each. Because some overruns have more than one cause listed, the total number of cause 
occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a phase. Entries in the 
column, Contributing Track Numbers, refer to the specific documents where a cause is 
used as justification for an overrun. A brief synopsis of the impact of the overruns in each 
phase is also provided. For comparison, the figures from the previous report (7/1192 -
2/13/94) are found in brackets beside the updated figures. 
Table 1: Breakdown of Highway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase. 
Phase Number of % Occurring * Total Cost of %Cost 
Occurrences Phase Overruns ** 
Design 34 [13] 12.9% [9.7%] $4,188,495 3.6% 
[$1 ,690,000] [2.4%] 
Right-of-way 62 [30] 23.6% [22.4%] $15,949,500 13.7% 
[$6,646,000] [9.6%] 
Utility Relocation 73 [38] 27.8% [28.4%] $24,650,568 2l.l% 
[$14,808,000] [21.3%] 
Construction 94 [53] 35.7% [39.5%] $72,004,123 61.7% 
[$46,359,094] [66.7%] 
Totals= 263 [134] 100% $116,792,686 100% 
[$69,503,094] 
* percent of the 263 overruns that occurred in each phase 
**percent of the total cost of the 263 overruns ($116,792,686) attributable to phase 
Design Phase Overrnns 
Overruns in the design phase accounted for 12.9% of the total number and 3.6% of the total 
cost of all overruns: thirty-four (34) overruns @ $4,188,495. Table 2 shows that 
underestimation because consultant fees were higher than the estimated in-house design 
costs, underestimation of the complexity of the project, and scope changes due to worse than 
expected site conditions were the three primary causes for design phase overruns. These 
causes accounted for 64.8% of all design phase overruns, slightly lower than the 69.3% 
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presented in the previous report. Two justifications have been added to the updated table; 
original estimate doesn't account for in-house evaluation of routine design project outlays 
and metric units, and underestimation of cost of bridge inspection effort account for 17.6% of 
the updated overruns. Overall, the number of overruns caused in the design phase has risen 
3.2% and the cost attributed to the design phase has risen 1.2%. 
Table 2: Breakdown of Design Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as {%of All Numbers* 
Causes for Design Design Phase 
Phase Overruns Overruns). 
underestimation of complexity of project 11 [3] 32.4% [23.1%] 5,88,89,143,11, 14, 
necessitating further design effort over 53,~~,22,71 
what was originally envisioned 
underestimation because consultant fees 7 [3] 20.6% [23.1 %] 98, 99, 
were higher than the estimated in-house 106,128,139,140,71 
design costs 
scope changes due to site conditions being 4 [3] 11.8% [23.1 %] 53, 96, 109,48 
worse than expected 
original estimate doesn't account for in- 3 [0] 8.8% [0.0%] 144,145,146 
house evaluation of routine design project 
outlays and metric units 
underestimation of cost of bridge 3 [0] 8.8% [0.0%] ~12,43 
inspection effort 
shift in alignment necessitating a greater 2 [I] 5.9% [7.7%] 2,65 
design effort than what was initially 
estimated 
initial estimate based on preliminary plans, 2 [I] 5.9% [7.7%] 37,49 
maps, and data 
scope changes due to local and public I [I] 2.9% [7.7%] 67 
pressure & involvement 
underestimation of design cost for large I [I] 2.9% [7.7%] 25 
scale landscaping project 
Totals= 34 [ 13] 100% 
*underlined numbers refer to the current bienniun 
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Right-of-way Overruns 
Overruns in the right-of-way phase accounted for 23.6% ofthe total number and 13.7% of the 
total cost of all overruns: sixty-two (62) overruns @ $15,949,500. Table 3 shows that the 
leading cause for right-of-way overruns was changes in project scope made during the design 
phase and after the initial estimate was made. Scope changes in design arose for a variety of 
reasons. Oftentimes, changes were made to provide an improved facility over what was 
originally envisioned. At other times, design calculations (i.e., hydraulic analysis, sight 
distance requirements, traffic impact studies, etc.) led to changes involving different right-of-
way parcels demands. These design changes included shifts in roadway alignment, widening 
of the proposed roadway and lengthening of bridges and approaches. The second leading 
cause of right-of-way overruns were estimates based on preliminary plans, maps, and project 
information. In the previous report these accounted for 72.5% of the right-of-way overruns, 
but currently they only account for 68.7%. New justifications such as unusually high jury 
awards, acquisition of utility easements, settling of ROW parcels to speed up the process, and 
changes in priority necessitating changing sequence of parcel acquisition have raised the 
occurrences of Right-of-way overruns by 1.2% and the cost by 4.1% since the last report. 
Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All ROW Numbers* 
Causes for ROW Phase Overruns) 
Phase Overruns 
changes in project scope as a result of 31 [16] 37.4% [40%] 3,24,51 ,51,55,62,63, 70, 
decisions made in design 71,76,83,86,95, 108,117, 
118,127,139,140,141, 
158, I O,ll,l6.,ll,23,22, 
ll,52,58,62 
initial estimate made with very 26 [13] 31.3% [32.5%] 3,6,7,9, 10, 16,40,59,69, 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 71,102,105,117,124,130, 
data: estimate updated based on more 152,154, 159,£,2.h,41,50, 
design detail 56,57,58,Q.l 
inadvertent omission 6 [4] 7.2% [10%] 1, 58, 70,76,158,50 
( contmued on next page) 
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Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns. (continued) 
changes in project scope as a result of 5 [2] 6.0% [5%] 38, 59,136,57,Q.l 
worse than expected site conditions 
land values increased in vicinity of 4 [I] 4.8% [2.5%] 16,158,1Q,56 
proposed right-of-way 
new or modified legislation enacted after 3 [3] 3.6% [7.5%] 16, 51, 64 
initial estimate made 
improvement made to right-of-way after 3 [I] 3.6% [2.5%] 72,133,57 
initial estimate was made 
unusually high jury award 2 [0] 2.4% [0%] 132, 58 
acquisition of utility easements (usually I [0] 1.2% [0%] .lQ 
part of the utility phase) 
settling of ROW parcel to speed up I [0] 1.2% [0] 24 
process 
changes in priority necessitating changing I [0] 1.2% [0] 38 
sequence of parcel acquisition 
Totals= 83 [40] 100% 
*underlined numbers refer to the current biennium 
Utility Relocation Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the utility relocation phase have decreased just less than one percent since last 
reported, currently accounting for 27.8% of the total number and 21.1% of the total cost of all 
overruns: seventy-three (73) overruns@ $24,650,568. Table 4 shows that the most frequent 
cause for utility relocation overruns, like that for the right-of-way phase, came from changes 
made in the project scope during the design phase. Similarly, the second leading cause for 
utility relocation phase overruns was due to initial estimates being made based on very 
preliminary plans, maps, and project information. Combined, these two causes account for 
59.2% of all the utility relocation phase overruns, just less than the 66.6% last reported. 
Three new justifications accounted for just 3% of the utility overruns. These new 
justifications included: unknown regulations forcinc more expensive solution for relocation, 
court decision establishing "prior rights status", and unforeseen relocation required for 
contractor's staging area. 
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Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers* 
Causes for Utility Utility 
relocation Phase relocation 
Overruns Phase 
Overruns). 
changes in project scope as a result of 33 [20] 32.0% [37%] 3,4, 50, 51,51, 52, 
decisions made in design 55,62,71, 75, 77, 86, 87, 
90,95,103, 104, 117, 119, 
120,122,123,127,131,134, 
137,141,159,U,l8., ;u_,;u, 
32 
initial estimate made with very 28 [16] 27.2%[29.6%] 3,6,7,9,22,23,39,60,68,69, 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 71,82,95, 102,105,117,124, 
data. Estimate updated based on more 133,152, 153,154,Q.,2,41,57, 
design detail Q.l,64 
increase in relocation costs over what was 11 [I] 10.7% [1.9%] 49,129,l,J..:l.,ll,57,63,72, 
expected 72,72,72 
changes in scope due to worse than 8 [4] 7.8% [7.4%] 38, 71, 82, 82,U,22.,Q.l,72 
expected site conditions 
inadvertent omission 6 [3] 5.8% [5.6%] 11, 49, 52,135, 159,ll 
underestimation of state force 4 [I] 3.9% [1.9%] 120,129,ll,72 
involvement cost 
new installation in proposed ROW after 3 [2] 2.9% [3.7%] 48, 120,1 
estimate made 
accidental transposition of two estimates 2 [2] 1.9% [2.1%] 8, 91 
in development of Y 
new laws enacted necessitating higher 2 [2] 1.9% [2.1%] 51,62 
utility relocation costs 
. 
no inflation factor on estimate I [1] 1.0% [1.0%] 82 
utility line thought to be privately owned I [I] 1.0% [1.0%] 48 
is actually publicly owned (this required 
full relocation reimbursement) 
( contmued on next page) 
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Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns. (continued) 
upgrade in utility line not realized at time I [I] 1.0% [1.9%] 36 
of estimate 
not aware of regulation which forced I [0] 1.0% [0%] 2. 
more expensive solution for relocation 
court decision establishing "prior rights I [0] 1.0% [0%] 11 
status" 
unforeseen relocation required for I [0] 1.0% [0%] 38 
contractor's staging area 
Totals= 103 [54] 100% 
*underlined numbers refer to the current bienniwn 
Construction Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 35.7% of the total number and 61.7% of the 
total cost of all overruns >15%: ninety-four (94) overruns@ $72,004,123. Although these 
percentages have decreased somewhat from 39.5% and 66.7% respectively, the majority of 
overruns to date still occur in the construction phase. In addition, the construction phase still 
comprises the largest percentage of the total overrun cost. Table 5 shows that the two leading 
causes for construction overruns were higher than expected unit bid prices and/or individual 
work item costs, and changes in project scope as a result of changes made in the design 
phase. These two causes were listed 55.6% of the time. Changes in project scope due to 
worse than asswned site conditions were also common causes for overruns, but decreased 
more than any other justification from 20.8% to 15.0%. Justifications added to the list were 
change in KyTC policy for contingency percent add-on, addition of work materials to make 
safe facility realized during the construction phase, and change in design due to 
environmental concerns. These new justifications comprised 7. 9% of all construction phase 
overruns. 
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Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers* 
Causes for Construction 
Construction Phase Phase 
Overruns Overruns). 
higher than expected unit bid prices 52 [23] 31.4% [29.9%] 12, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 
and/or individual work item costs 28, 34, 35, 35, 42, 43, 44, 
46,47,54,54,56,57,57, 
66,79,142,147,151,157,.3A. 
1,.12,2Q,£8.22..l!l..ll.Jl.JQ. 
R~~~:!M:Z.. Q.Q. 
2M:Z..2li.~~~ 76 
changes in project scope as a result of 37 [22] 24.2% [28.6%] 13, 18, 21, 26, 30, 31, 34, 
decisions made in design 35,41,46,54,56,61,66, 
74, 79, 80, 101, 107, 110, 
111,112,125,126,147,148, 
149,150,151,155,2,:Z.,li,.ll, 
12,66,69 
changes in scope due to worse than 24 [16] 15.0% [20.8%] 14, 17, 27, 32, 33, 65, 73, 
expected site conditions 74, 78,84,85,92,94,97, 
112,113,142,151,2!!,21,12., 
47,7Jl, 75 
utility work done in construction phase 12 [2] 7.2% [2.6%] 45,116,126,150,157,;)_,2,:Z., 
M,Q.Q,22, 7 6 
inadvertent omission 9 [6] 5.9% [7.8%] 19, 42, 43, 85, 93, 
101,12_,12,69 
change in KyTC policy for contingency 8 [0] 5.2% [0%] 30, 35,.3.Q,12,46, 11.21..2.8. 
percent add-on 
initial estimate made with very 6 [4] 3.9% [5.2%] 15, 29, 57, 81,12,47 
preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data: estimate updated 
based on more design detail 
complexity of construction 4 [I] 2.6% [1.3%] 21,157,1,67 
underestimated 
addition of work materials to make safe 3 [0] 2.0% [0%] 138,21,40 
facility realized during the construction 
phase 
bonuses for minimal traffic impact I [I] 0.7% [1.3%] 85 
given 
( contmued on next page) 
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Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. (continued) 
sporadic contractor activity led to I [I] 0.7% [1.3%] 97 
higher than expected state supervision 
costs 
two separate construction phases I [I] 0.7% [1.3%] IOO 
combined to minimize overall cost to 
state 
change in design due to environmental I [0] 0.7% [0%] I 56 
concerns 
Totals= I 59 [77] 100% 
*underlined numbers refer to the current biennium 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Tables 1-5. 
• Design phase overruns account for only 3.55% of the total cost of all overruns reported. 
Design phase overruns are not a major problem. 
• Based on the 257 overruns to date, the following would likely have occurred if estimates 
had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the design phase was 
completed: 
• 68.7% of the right-of-way overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• 62.9% of the utility relocation phase overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• 30.7% of construction overrun causes would potentially have been eliminated. 
• Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed 
12.5% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 6.0% for right-of-way overruns, 
7.2% for utility relocation overruns, and 15.0% for construction overruns. Increased site 
investigation by designers and estimators might have reduced these overruns, however, 
some soil conditions and contamination will always present problems. 
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• Construction phase overruns accounted for almost 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns. It 
was stated that 30.7% of construction overrun cause occurrence could potentially be 
eliminated if estimates were made after design was complete. An additional 31.4% of 
overrun cause occurrence could be reduced if accurate unit bid price data were used. 
• Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing of numbers, or 
switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated 
periodically. 
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PRECONSTRUCTION COST -PER-MILE DATABASE 
The purpose for compiling a database of historical preconstruction costs is to provide an 
estimator with information about past projects to use in making estimates for new 
projects. Relevant cost data and key project information were collected and stored in a 
manner that allows an estimator to efficiently select those data useful for estimating a 
new project, i.e. those historical unit costs from projects which have similar 
characteristics. 
Projects in the database were defined by twelve key attributes: 
I District 
2 Item# 
3 County 
4 Type of work 
5 Functional classification 
6 Number of lanes 
7 Length 
8 Percent bridge length 
9 Number of bridges or major culverts 
I 0 Award year 
!! Route Name 
!2 TD-!0 Number 
District - state highway district or districts; by number I - !2 
Item # - district identifier number 
County - county or counties; by name 
Type of work- FHW A Order M5600.!A, !2/87 (see appendix) 
Functional classification - KyTC classification system (see appendix) 
Number oflanes- number of lanes involved 
Length - length in miles to three decimal points 
Percent bridge length-%= [bridge length/project length] 
Number of bridges- total number of bridges (or culverts> $50,000) in project 
Award year - calendar year project was awarded for construction 
Route Name- number of road: US60, KY!09, etc. 
TD-!0 Number- number on the Project Authorization Form 
Along with the above attributes is the cost of each preconstruction phase, by project and 
by mile. 
!6 
An effort was made to collect all data that significantly relate to preconstruction phases of 
6YP projects completed during the years 1990-1994. The search was limited to the last 
four years because of missing data related to the twelve key attributes. 
Brief project descriptions, district, item #, county, type of work, length, authorization 
year, location, and preconstruction cost data were obtained from the Project 
Authorization System (PAS) in the KyTC Programming Office. Functional classification 
and number of lanes were obtained from the KyTC Planning Office. Route name and 
TD-10 #was obtained from the Contractor's Pay Estimate System (CPES) in the KyTC 
Construction Division. 
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CONSTRUCTION COST PER MILE DATABASE 
Like the database of preconstruction costs, a database of historical costs was created to 
provide an estimator with information about past construction costs. The databases were 
created separately for two primary reasons. First, preconstruction phases for a project usually 
involve the same scope of work, whereas the construction phase often involves change orders 
and claims. Secondly, the construction phase is usually broken into segments and let at 
different times, so correlation between the preconstruction costs for the entire project and the 
construction cost of a single segment of the project is difficult. 
Projects in the database were defined by the same twelve key attributes as in the 
preconstruction database. Along with the above attributes is the cost of each construction 
segment, by project and by mile. 
As with the preconstruction data, key attributes were missing from many projects, precluding 
their inclusion in the databases. 
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COST-PER-MILE MODEL 
The Cost-per-mile Model is a computer based program, written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0, 
that: 
a) allows an estimator to access the preconstruction and construction data bases, 
b) allows an estimator to select a set of past projects that are similar to the new project, 
c) processes the data related to the set of past projects producing an estimate based on 
historical data, 
d) allows an estimator to either accept the estimate based on historical data or to enter a 
new estimate, 
e) provides statistical information about the predicted accuracy of the new estimate 
based on past projects, and 
f) produces a Surmnary Sheet with the new estimate and important information about 
what the model predicts. 
The model, called KYEstimate, is very user-friendly. Since it is still under development, 
the following example represents neither the total capability nor the final format, but 
simply shows how KYEstimate is used. 
EXAMPLE 
A new estimate is needed for the preconstruction phases of a 4-lane major widening 
project in Clark County on a principal arterial. The road length is five miles with one 
400' bridge. 
All information relevant to the estimate is provided on the Estimate Summary Sheet 
screen shown in Figure 3. 
After entering the information identifYing the project, etc. (Estimate Identification, Figure 
3), the estimator moves to the preconstruction database and selects criteria to use in the 
search for completed projects similar to the new project. The criteria are set by selecting 
combinations of items under each of the headings in Table 3. These items may be 
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I Sl n1 ·\'! E SIIM\IARY SHEET 
E STIMATE IDENTmCATION 
PROJECT ID# ~~S60 Clark Co. I ~ IKYEstimate ROAD NAME I D!STRJCT 
ESTIMATOR 11. Stevens I DATE OF ESTIMATE ,I Julv 1995 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS· (COMPUTER RESULTS) 
DESIGN ROW UTILITY CONSTR TOTAL 
MEANS/MILE 121,073 166,482 120,747 725,000 1,133.302 
STANDARD DEVIATION 67,804 277.278 148,009 175,300 
HISTORJCAL MAX SIMILE 227.540 645,833 333,333 1.234.500 2,441,206 
HISTORJCAL MIN SIMILE 41,237 1,915 8,996 674.300 726,448 
SIZE OF DATABASE 5 5 5 10 
USER ESTIMATE 
DESIGN ROW UTILITY CONSTR TOTAL 
USER ESTIMATE (SIMILE) 125.000 350,000 120,000 i25~000 1.320.000 
PROS OF EXCEEDANCE (%) 0.46 0.24 0.50 0.50 
-
Z= #OF STD DEVS AWAY 0.06 0.66 -0.01 0 
% UNDER/OVER MEAN $/MILE 3.24 110.23 -0.62 0 16.47 
6 YP ESTIMATE 
APPROXIMATE PROJECT LENGTH (MILES) = 5.00 
DESIGN ROW UTILITY CONSTR TOTAL 
MEAN ESTIMATE ($) 605.363 832,412 603,737 3,625,000 5,666,512 
USER ESTIMATE (S) 625.000 1,750.000 600.000 3.625.000 6,600.000 
6 YP ESTIMATE ($) 625.000 1.750.000 600.000 3.625.000 6.6oo.ooo I 
SUMMARY OF DATABASE SEARCH CRITERIA 
DISTRICT 7 
COUNTY! Cl ark 
COUNTY2 
WORK TYPE 40 
iiLANESI 4 
%LANES I 100 
#LANES2 
%LANES2 
FCLASSI RPAO 
%FCLASSI 
. 
100 
FCLASS2 
%FCLASS2 
LENGTH 5.00 
BLPID 0.015 
NOB I 
AUTHYR 95 
ESTIMATE JUSTIFICATION/SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
This proJeCt IS Similar to others on this road. ROW will be higher because oi development along 
this comdor. 
Figure 3. Estimate Summary Sheet 
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combined by using logical queries. In the case oftext, the queries may be AND, OR, =, 
etc. In the case of numbers, the queries may be =, >=, etc. 
In this case, after trying various combinations, the estimator selects the following: 
Preconstruction Phases, District l and Work Type 40. In the other fields All items are 
automatically selected. The search of the preconstruction database using these criteria 
finds the projects data shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Search Results 
PlC DISTRICT COUNTY! COUNTY2 WORK. TYPE #LANES! %LANES! 
PRE 7 fayette scott 40 4 100 
PRE 7 fayette 40 6 100 
PRE 7 boy le 40 4 100 
PRE 7 anderson 40 4 100 
PRE 7 fayette 40 2 100 
#LANES2 %LANES2 FCLASSI %FCLASS I FCLASS2 %FCLASS2 LENGTH 
RPAI 100 20.107 
UOPA 100 I 
UOPA 100 5.27 
RPAO 66 UOPA 33 8.879 
UMA 100 2.4 
NOB BLPID AUTHYR 
12 0.0204 86 
I 0.04 86 
2 0.0093 88 
3 0.0116 88 
I 0.0088 83 
The cost-per-mile of the selected past projects is calculated and presented on the screen 
(Statistical Analysis, Figure 3). 
The estimator can use the estimates for each phase determined by the means of the actual 
costs of past projects in the selected set or enter a new estimate. If a new estimate is 
entered, statistical information about the probability of the estimate's accuracy based on 
past data is presented (User Estimate, Figure 3). The estimate to be used in the six-year 
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plan is shown (6 YP Estimate, Figure 3). The estimator then records the criteria used for 
the set of projects used in the trial estimate (Search Criteria, Figure 3.). Also, any 
justification for the new estimate being higher or lower than the historical data would 
predict is recorded (Estimate Justification, Figure 3). 
The model, while simple in concept, is actually quite complex. 
An experienced estimator would likely make a better estimate than would KYEstimate. 
However, an experienced estimator is not always available, and it is sometimes difficult 
to justifY an estimate when actual costs are quite different. Using KYEstimate and 
making a new estimate in line with past experience is a conservative approach to 
conceptual estimating and provides justification based on past experience. 
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RIGHT-OF-WAY COST-PER-PARCEL DATABASE 
The Cost-per-mile Model is used for conceptual estimating only and is based on actual 
total costs of past projects. Once a route is established for a new project, parameters 
other than number of miles may provide a better basis for an estimate. The Right-of-way 
Database contains projects defined by twelve key attributes: 
1 District 7 Cost of Parcel 
2 Item# 8 Area of Parcel 
3 County 9 Building to be Purchased 
4 Parcel# 10 Litigation on Parcel 
5 Owner's Name 11 Right-of-way Estimate 
6 Parcel Type 12 TD-10# 
District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12 
Item # - district identifier number 
County - county or counties; by name 
Parcel# - number assigned to parcel by the right-of-way division 
Owner's Name -last name of the owner of a particular parcel 
Parcel Type - categorizes parcel according to highest and best use: residential, 
commercial, industrial, and agricultural 
Cost of Parcel - final cost of the parcel 
Area of Parcel - size of parcel in acres 
Purchase of a Building - indicates if an existing building has been condemned 
Litigation- indicates litigation required to obtain a parcel 
Right-of-way Estimate - conceptual estimate made prior to project authorization 
A Cost-per-parcel Model, similar to the Cost-per-mile Model, is under development. 
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
Improving the estimating process requires performance measurements with which to benchmark 
progress. Questionnaires and interviews with KyTC district office personnel, and a study of 
measurements used by Florida's Highway Department, were conducted in an effort to determine 
what performance measurements were appropriate. 
A questionnaire was sent to the twelve district highway offices asking about the current process 
of developing conceptual estimates and 70% of them were returned. Responses indicate that 
estimators are comfortable with their conceptual estimates and understand what they are used for, 
but are not certain what constitutes a good conceptual estimate because of a lack of feedback. 
There is no standard statewide procedure with clear guidelines on how conceptual estimates 
should be developed. 
Comments on recommended improvements to the conceptual estimating process are shown on 
the Pareto diagram in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Recommended Improvements 
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The Florida Transportation Cabinet (FTC) developed performance measurements which are used 
by an appointed oversight committee to access the department's performance annually. This 
process has improved accountability and the public's perception of the department. 
Performance measurements currently being investigated include: 
Actual cost of project phases vs. Estimated cost of project phases 
Number of projects let vs. Number of projects planned to let 
Actual Revenues vs. Estimated Revenues 
Number of projects negotiated vs. Number of projects litigated 
Number of projects certified for construction vs. Number scheduled to certify 
Amount of money received from federal turnovers at end of the federal FY 
Standard Deviation of: [[A- E]/A]*lOO for each year 
Number of project overruns 
Number of project underruns 
These and other performance measurements will be studied during the next year. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to 
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reporting requirements of the oversight law, 
KRS45.245, impose additional work on the KyTC. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is 
required, are in some cases impossible to meet, and, in other cases, possible to meet only 
with additional staffing and/or by not performing current duties. 
The current oversight requirement has resulted in 263 overruns worth nearly $117 million 
being presented to the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation for review to date (7/1/92 -
7/1/95). All of these overruns have been approved. The IJCT makes no concerted effort to 
track cost underruns. 
The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and causes a lot of wasted effort by KyTC 
personnel. It would be better to use different thresholds for different phases, or to allow 
updating estimates once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is 
available. 
An improvement to the current process would be to require that only overruns over a certain 
amount be formally presented to the IJCT and others require only a paper notification. The 
amount would be determined by a statistically analysis of overruns during the past few years. 
The conceptual estimating process can be improved by using actual costs of past projects to 
develop estimates for new projects. To do this requires that critical data be kept on all 
projects. KYEstimate can process historical data to allow estimators to use only those 
projects with like characteristics when preparing a new estimate. 
Estimates for right-of-way costs can be improved by using actual costs of past projects. The 
cost-per-parcel database under development will assist estimators in preparing estimates 
when information is available about the route and the parcels needed to be acquired. 
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Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make 
them available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve 
estimating ability but will serve to help justifY estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting 
ability and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. To seize this 
opportunity, both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political 
and fiscal realities. 
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PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following preliminary recommendations are made, based on the findings of the first two 
years of this three-year study. 
• Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature. 
• Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be 
done with current resources. 
• Develop statewide and regional databases of highway costs. 
• Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization. 
• Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that a 
cause and effect relationship can be established. 
• Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use. 
• Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates. 
• Require an estimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on the 
Project Authorization Form (TC-10). 
• IJCT adapt the oversight implementation to better track performance and reduce the 
added burden on the KyTC. 
• Track project phase underruns of> 15% as well as overruns. 
• Limit formal reports of overruns to those that have a potential of being disapproved. 
• Instead of a flat> 15% limit, use different limits based on class of estimate. 
• Let projects be carried through Phase I design without the 15% limitation. 
A small group, representing both legislators and the KyTC, should work with the researcher 
to articulate details of a process that meets political and fiscal realities. This would facilitate 
the implementation of needed improvements and lead to better relations within state 
government. 
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PATH FORWARD 
Specific goals for year 3 are: 
• to finish development of on the Cost-per-Mile Database and Model, 
• to finish development of the Right-of-Way, Cost-per-Parcel Database and Model, 
• to work with the KyTC to get project data recorded in a place and format that can be used 
to update the databases being developed, 
• to develop a set of performance measurements that will allow the KyTC and the 
Legislature to assess improvement in the estimating process, 
• to develop tools and standard estimating procedures for KyTC estimators, 
• to develop a plan and a program to train KyTC personnel on the new estimating tools and 
procedures, and 
• to maintain contact with officials within the KyTC and the Legislature in an effort to 
develop a cost forecasting strategy that will satisfY both parties and will benefit the 
citizens of Kentucky. 
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